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THE ECONOMICS OF LEVERAGED
TAKEOVERS
KENNETH LEHN,*
DAVID W. BLACKWELL,**
and M. WAYNE MARR***
Financing of hostile takeovers has emerged as a central issue in the
ongoing debate concerning corporate takeovers. Concomitant with the
increase in the dollar value of takeovers during the past few years has
been a significant increase in the percentage of tender offer financing ac-
counted for by bank borrowing and the issuance of high yield debt, (that
is, debt securities which are rated below Standard and Poor's BBB-or
Moody's Baa3),1 hereafter referred to as junk bonds, have accounted for
an increasingly greater percentage of takeover financing. A Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) study, for example, found that the in-
ternal funds of acquiring firms, which proved 47.1% of takeover financ-
ing in 1981, financed only 6.8% of the value of takeovers that occurred
during the first six months of 1985.2 During the same period, bank bor-
rowing by acquiring firms increased from 50.5% of takeover financing to
77.6%.' The issuance of junk bonds by acquiring firms, a rare occur-
rence in 1981, represented 13.6% of takeover financing in 1985. 4
The increased use of debt to finance corporate takeovers appears to be
directly related to the recent increase in the size of target firms. Indeed,
Assistant Professor of Business and Public Policy, Washington University.
* Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Georgia.
*** Associate Professor of Finance, Tulane University.
1. High yield debt (junk bonds) are corporate bonds that are rated below investment grade by
the major rating agencies-Standard and Poor's and Moody's Investor Service. These ratings reflect
each agency's estimate of the firm's ability to repay its debt obligation (i.e., to pay interest and repay
principal when due). The highest rating is AAA ((Aaa) for Moody's). These firms have an ex-
tremely strong ability to pay interest and repay principal. The bonds are then ranked by this ability
on the following scale: AA(Aa), A(A), BBB(Baa), BB(Ba), B(B). Some bonds are even rated below
B. Bonds rated BB(Ba) and below are regarded as speculative bonds and are also referred to as high-
yield bonds or junk bonds. For more information, see: E. ALTMAN & S. NAMMACHER, INVESTING
IN JUNK BONDS (1987).
2. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NONIN-
VESTMENT GRADE DEBT AS A SOURCE OF TENDER OFFER FINANCING, reprinted in [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,011 (June 20, 1986).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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the advent of hostile offers for large corporations seems inextricably
linked to the availability of debt financing, especially junk-bond financ-
ing, for acquiring firms. Historically, "Fortune 100" companies were
thought to be immune from hostile takeovers. During the past few years,
however, numerous Fortune 100 firms, including Gulf Oil, Unocal, Phil-
lips Petroleum, Union Carbide, USX, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber,
have become target firms in hostile tender offers. The internal funds of
acquiring firms provide only a small percentage of the funds necessary to
acquire control of these larger target firms.' Consequently, takeover bids
for larger firms entail considerably more debt financing than tender offers
for smaller firms.6
These developments have focused the attention of legislators, regula-
tors, and commentators on the issue of leveraged takeovers. During
1985, Congress considered four different bills to regulate the use of junk
bonds as a means of financing corporate takeovers7 and convened more
than a dozen hearings related to leveraged takeovers. In response to peti-
tions fied by four target firms during hostile takeover battles,' the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, in January 1986, issued an interpretative rule which
extended the margin requirements of Regulation G to some leveraged
takeovers.9 Various federal and state regulatory agencies are studying
proposals to restrict the ability of savings and loan institutions and insur-
ance companies to invest in junk bonds.10 Infotrac, a news retrieval sys-
tem that surveys articles in the popular press, academic literature and
trade journals, lists 1 citation to an article on junk bonds in 1984, 34
citations in 1985, and 139 citations to articles on junk bonds in 1986.
Critics of hostile takeovers have raised several objections to leveraged
takeovers which purportedly justify a regulatory response. Many critics
argue that so-called corporate raiders, in their quest for financial profits,
5. The SEC study shows that the acquiring firms' internal funds accounted for 66.7% of take-
over financing for the 30 smallest takeovers during the first three quarters of fiscal year 1985, but
only 8.3% for the 30 largest takeovers during this period. Id.
6. The SEC study found that bank borrowing financed 33% of the 30 smallest takeovers, but
financed 56.8% of the 30 largest takeovers. Id. The issuance ofjunk bonds provided no funding for
the 30 smallest takeovers, but funded 32.9% of the 30 largest takeovers. Id.
7. S. 1286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S8020 (daily ed. June 12, 1985) (introduced
by Sen. Pete Domenici); H.R. 2476, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H3197 (daily ed. May 13,
1985) (introduced by Rep. William Richardson).
8. Unocal, Pacific Lumber, Revlon, and Union Carbide filed petitions.
9. 51 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 207.112).
10. See, eg., Bank Board Staff Expects to Offer Rules Curbing Thrifts' "Junk Bond" Invest-
ments, Wall St. J., September 8, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
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impose artificially high debt burdens upon target firms which greatly un-
dermine the future solvency of these firms."' In order to make the sub-
stantial coupon payments on this debt after the takeover, it is argued,
raiders must sell corporate assets and reduce expenditures on capital in-
vestment and research and development. Furthermore, to prevent a hos-
tile takeover, many large corporations have "voluntarily" restructured,
often finding that the market positively revalues their equity when the
corporation issues more debt, buys back stock, and sells some assets.
These critics cite data which show that the ratio of the value of debt to
the value of equity for non-financial corporations has increased signifi-
cantly during recent years. 2 In short, critics argue that leveraged take-
overs preoccupy corporate managers with short-term corporate goals and
make our economy vulnerable to a severe depression in the event of an
economic downturn or an increase in interest rates.
Leveraged two-tier takeover offers elicit particularly harsh criticism. 3
In a two-tier takeover, the bidder acquires a partial stake in the target
corporation by a tender offer and then issues debt securities in a second-
tier exchange offer to complete the takeover. Subordinated debt securi-
ties typically are issued in the second tier, and it is argued that these
securities are likely to be valued at a deep discount from their face value.
Some critics assert that shareholders who wish to avoid the second-tier
compensation in highly leveraged two-tier offers are "coerced" into ac-
cepting the cash premium in the first-tier. This shareholder coercion
facilitates the bidder's acquisition of the target firm but, critics argue,
treats some target shareholders unfairly and may also allow bidders to
acquire target firms at less than their "intrinsic" value.
Finally, some critics of leveraged takeovers charge that, although these
transactions may create significant wealth for shareholders in target
firms, they also may impose substantial losses on debtholders in target
11. See, eg., Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the Effect of Mergers on Management Practices,
Cost Availability of Credit, and the Long-Term Viability of American Industry, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
7, 18-19 (1985) (statement of Martin Lipton, senior partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz)
[hereinafter Hearings on the Effect of Mergers].
12. See, eg., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BALANCE SHEET
FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1945-83, at 36-45 & Table 705 (Nov. 1984).
13. See, eg., Hearings on the Effect of Mergers, supra note 11, at 985 (statement of Kenneth H.
Miller, Managing Director of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith's Department of Mergers and
Acquisition).
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firms. 4 If debtholders' (and preferred stockholders') losses exceed stock-
holders' gains, then corporate takeovers actually reduce the value of tar-
get firms.
This Article examines these concerns about debt financing of corporate
takeovers from an "efficient markets" perspective. 5 The efficient-market
hypothesis has important implications for public policy toward corporate
takeovers. Because a takeover involves the payment of premiums to tar-
get shareholders, prospective bidders must perceive a way to raise the
target firm's value, that is, the discounted cash flow of the target firm.
Unless the combined firms' reduced tax liability or greater ability to fix
product prices at anti-competitive levels finance these premiums, the ex-
pected increase in cash flow must result from economics of scale, vertical
synergies, or improved management of the target firm.16
We argue that junk-bond financing facilitates takeovers which in turn
promote economic efficiency. Critics of leveraged takeovers, in our view,
exaggerate the risks associated with these transactions, and in some in-
stances, misunderstand the nature of corporate debt. After illustrating
the structure of a leveraged takeover with an analysis of Mesa Petro-
leum's unsuccessful bid for Unocal, this Article seeks to correct the mis-
14. See, eg., M. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance-A Supplement (March
10, 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
15. Gilson and Kraakman describe the efficient market hypothesis as "the context in which
serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place." Gilson & Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984) (emphasis in original). According
to the efficient-market hypothesis, security "prices at any time 'fully reflect' all available informa-
tion." Fama, Efficient Capital Markets A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970). Economists base their widespread acceptance of the efficient-market hypothesis not simply
on a dogmatic belief in the informational content of prices, but on a large body of empirical evidence,
and the logic of the arbitrage process:
It is very unlikely that price and "value" will diverge in large markets for shares. If there
were such divergences, investors could reap substantial gains by identifying and buying
underpriced shares and selling overpriced shares. Since there are many sophisticated inves-
tors with ample capital, the arbitrage process would proceed quite quickly, and it would
become impossible to make systematic gains by finding undervalued shares.... The pro-
cess of estimation and trading leads to prices that embody all of the available information
about the stock.
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1981) (footnote omitted).
16. As Jensen has noted:
The takeover market ... provides a unique, powerful, and impersonal mechanism to ac-
complish the major restructuring and redeployment of assets continually required by
changes in technology and consumer preferences. Recent changes occurring in the oil in-
dustry provide a good example. Scientific evidence indicates that activities in the market
for corporate control almost uniformly increase efficiency and shareholders' wealth.
Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 120 (1984).
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perceptions about corporate debt with a discussion of the economics of
corporate leverage. Finally, we use the Mesa-Unocal case to evaluate the
claims made by critics of leveraged takeovers.
I. STRUCTURE OF A LEVERAGED TAKEOVER-THE
MESA-UNOCAL CASE
Although leveraged takeovers differ from case to case, Mesa Petro-
leum Company's unsuccessful hostile takeover bid for Unocal Corpora-
tion illustrates the typical structure of a leveraged takeover. Four
characteristics common to leveraged takeovers were present in the Mesa-
Unocal case: 1) a great disparity in the relative size of the bidder vis-a-
vis the target; 2) an offer at a substantial premium over the pre-offer price
of the target's common stock; 3) the use of a shell corporation to make
the offer; and 4) heavy reliance on debt to finance the offer.
Unocal, the parent company of Union Oil Company of California, had
revenues of $11.5 billion in 1984. Ranked thirty-first on the 1984 For-
tune 500 list, Unocal employed 20,664 workers, principally in the explo-
ration, production, transportation, refining, and marketing of crude oil
and natural gas. In addition, Unocal was an integrated producer of pe-
trochemical products, industrial and agricultural chemicals, geothermal
resources, and it developed oil shale, coal, and real estate. By contrast,
Mesa had revenues of $413.5 million in 1984, less than 4% of Unocal's
1984 revenues. Unlike Unocal, Mesa was neither a fully integrated nor
diversified oil company. Employing 657 workers, Mesa was engaged ex-
clusively in the exploration and production of oil, natural gas condensate,
and natural gas liquids. The value of Unocal, measured by the sum of
the book value of its debt and the market value of its equity, was approxi-
mately $9 billion in 1984; by comparison, the corresponding value of
Mesa in 1984 was only $3.3 billion.1 7 Moreover, Unocal had a signifi-
cantly lower ratio of long-term debt to common equity than Mesa-
0.40:1 to 1.74:1.
On February 14, 1985, Mesa disclosed in a Schedule 13D filing with
the SEC that it had acquired 7.9% of Unocal's common stock and an-
17. Although the summed market value of a firm's debt and equity provides the best estimate of
its discounted cash flow, market values of corporate debt generally are unavailable. Thus, following
convention, we approximated the value of Unocal's and Mesa's debt claims by the book value of
their debt. At the end of 1984, the book value of Unocal's debt amounted to $2.6 billion. The
market value of its common equity totaled $6.4 billion. Mesa's long-term debt had a book value of
$2.1 billion. The market value of its common stock totaled $1.1 billion.
1987]
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nounced its intention to increase its holdings. Twenty business days
prior to this disclosure, on January 17, Unocal's common stock closed at
a price of $34.625 per share. On the day of Mesa's disclosure, Unocal's
common stock closed at $48 per share. Hence, during the period in
which Mesa accumulated its initial stake in Unocal, the market, presum-
ably speculating about a pending tender offer, revalued Unocal's com-
mon stock by 38.6%. The market positively revalued Mesa's common
stock as well. Mesa's stock increased 8.7%, from $17.375 per share to
$18.875 per share. During this same period, the Standard & Poor's
(S&P) 400 Industrial Index increased only 6.9%.
On April 8, Mesa formally announced its two-tier takeover bid for
Unocal. In the first step, Mesa offered $54 in cash per share for 64 mil-
lion shares of Unocal's common stock. If successful, this offer, combined
with Mesa's earlier open-market acquisitions, would give Mesa control of
50.1% of Unocal's outstanding common stock. Mesa would follow this
first-step offer with an offer to purchase the remaining shares of Unocal's
common stock in exchange for a package of debt securities with a face
value of $54 per share. This debt would become the obligation of the
entity surviving the merger of Unocal and Mesa.
On the day of Mesa's announcement, Unocal's common stock closed
at a price of $49.75 per share, reflecting the market valuation of Mesa's
two-tier offer (discounted by the market's expectation of the offer's
probability of success). Coupled with its pre-offer acquisitions, Mesa's
tender offer substantially revalued Unocal's common equity-from Janu-
ary 17 to April 8 the market of Unocal's shares had increased 43.7%.
On April 8, Mesa's common stock closed at $19, representing a 9.4%
increase in value since January 15. During the same period the S&P
Industrial Index increased only 4.1%.
Employing a technique common to many bidders in leveraged take-
overs, Mesa created a shell company to consummate its bid for Unocal.
Figure 1 diagrams the structure of the transaction. Mesa Petroleum and
a partnership, Wagner & Brown, created two companies for the purpose
of making the offer: Mesa Partners II and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Mesa Eastern, referred to as Newco. Mesa Partners II held the 23.7 mil-
lion shares of Unocal common stock acquired in the open market prior to
the tender offer. Mesa's initial tender offer consisted of Mesa Partners
II's offer for 16 million shares and Newco's offer for 48 million shares.
Upon successful completion of the two-tier offer, Unocal would merge
into Newco. Mesa Partner II would transfer its holdings of Unocal stock
[Vol. 65:163
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to Newco, and Newco would assume responsibility to pay the debts of
Mesa Partners II. Mesa Petroleum would then manage Unocal's assets
through Newco.
FIGURE 1
Financing for Mesa's initial tender offer came from
sources:
Capital Contribution from Mesa Partners II
Newco's issuance of senior notes
Newco's issuance of senior preferred stock
Newco's issuance of common stock
Newco's issuance of junior preferred stock
the following
$ 864 million
1,800 million
600 million
2 million
587 million
$3,853 million
Mesa Partners II's capital contribution came from borrowings from a
group of banks. The 39.7 million shares of Unocal stock that Mesa Part-
ners II would hold upon successful completion of the offer secured these
loans, which therefore became subject to Regulation U, " the Federal Re-
serve Board's margin requirement pertaining to bank loans.
18. 12 C.F.R. § 221.1 (1986).
1987]
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If Mesa successfully completed its first-step offer, Newco's assets
would consist of $270.5 million in cash and short-term investments and
$4,645 million representing its holdings of Unocal stock (net of the esti-
mated $395.5 million expenses of the offer). None of these assets, how-
ever, would secure Newco's debt obligations. Newco's senior notes
would mature in 1992, but could be redeemed after 1987. Newco sched-
uled its senior preferred stock for mandatory redemption in 1995 and its
junior preferred stock in 1994.
In the second-step merger, Newco would issue an additional $4,708.8
million in subordinated notes and preferred stock in exchange for the
remaining 49.9% of Unocal's common stock. Through its investment
banker, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Mesa also received commit-
ments from investors to purchase the securities that Newco would issue if
the first-tier offer succeeded. In exchange for these commitments, Mesa
paid the prospective investors fees totaling $22.5 million. If the offer
failed, Newco would issue no securities, and Mesa would forfeit the com-
mitment fees.
Table 1 contains the pro forma capitalization of Newco pending suc-
cessful execution of the two-tier bid. 9 The data reveal that the book
value of Newco's long-term debt and preferred stock would total
$10,882.2 million. Newco's common equity would have a book value of
$10 million. Combining Newco's capital structure with Mesa's pre-offer
structure reveals that, if its offer succeeded, Mesa's capital structure (i.e.,
the capital structure of the combined companies) would consist of ap-
proximately $11,365.7 million in long-term debt and $1,232 million in
common equity, a debt-to-equity ratio of approximately 9.23:1. In addi-
tion, the combined company would have $1,641.5 million in preferred
stock outstanding.
In short, Mesa financed its offer for Unocal almost exclusively by debt.
If successful, the offer would have resulted in a company with an ex-
tremely high debt-equity ratio judged by "normal" industry standards.
Mesa, however, terminated its bid after Unocal successfully blocked
Mesa's takeover attempt with its own leverage-increasing recapitalization
plan.
19. See The Financing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 217
(1985) (document submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding purchase of
stock in Unocal Corp.).
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TABLE 1: PRO FORMA CAPITALIZATION TABLE FOR NEWCO,
PENDING SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF TwO-STEP TENDER
OFFER (IN MILLIONS)
Current Portion of Long-Term
Debt and Capital Lease
Obligations
Capitalization:
Existing Bonds, Debentures, Notes
and Capital Lease Obligations
Indebtedness incurred to Repay
Bank Debt of Affiliates
Series A Senior Notes
Series B Senior Note
Senior Subordinated Notes
Subordinated Notes to be Issued
in Merger
Preferred Stock to be Issued in
Merger
Senior Exchangeable Preferred
Stock
Junior Preferred Stock:
Series A, owned by Mesa
Series B, owned by Partners
Less Valuation Adjustment
Newco Common Stock
Existing Stockholders' Equity
Total Capitalization
Historical
(Unocal)
$ 217.1
1,267.9
$ 864.0
1,000.0
800.0
600.0
4,708.0
5,694.3
$6,962.2
Pro Forma
Adjustments
586.5
1,271.8
(216.8)
10.0
(5,694.3)
Pro Forma
(Combined)
Unocal-Newco
$ 217.1
1,267.9
864.0
1,000.0
800.0
600.0
4,708.0
586.5
1,271.8
(216.8)
10.0
$10,892.2
II. ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LEVERAGE
Critics of leveraged takeovers have made many broad assertions about
the use of debt to finance these transactions. Often, these critics errone-
ously analogize corporate debt to personal or government debt.20 This
leads many critics to decry the burgeoning corporate debt as threatening
to catapult the economy into the throes of depression.21 These critics,
20. See infra text accompanying note 21.
21. Hearings on the Effect of Mergers, supra note 11, at 72 (statement of Thornton Bradshaw)
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
however, misperceive the problem. Although there are costs associated
with higher levels of debt, these costs do not arise simply by altering the
mix of debt and equity. Thus, before turning to the specific arguments
against leveraged takeovers, it is important to isolate the potential costs
of these transactions.
In discussing the economics of corporate leverage, it is useful to ex-
amine corporations from a contractual, or agency, perspective.22 Viewed
from this perspective, corporations are comprised of contractual arrange-
ments involving individuals (e.g., workers, suppliers, debtholders, bond-
holders) who contribute resources to the firm in exchange for a claim on
the firm's expected revenues. Of course, the claimants differ with respect
to whether their claim is fixed or variable, when their claim is paid, the
priority of their claim, and so forth.
If the contribution of the claimants' resources is not perfectly synchro-
nized with the payment of their claims, then the claimants effectively
loan resources to the firm in exchange for a future payment. For exam-
ple, employees typically contribute labor time to firms in exchange for a
wage and benefit package that is financed out of the firms' expected reve-
nues.23 Workers who receive monthly compensation effectively "loan"
their labor time to the firm in exchange for a claim on the firm's revenues
one month hence. Similarly, all deferred compensation and pension ben-
efits represent employees' claims on future revenues in exchange for serv-
ices already rendered. Although the term "leverage" conventionally is
affixed to only a subset of a firm's contractual arrangements, leverage
actually characterizes most of the contracts between a firm and its
claimants.
In many respects, debtholders and stockholders are similar to other
claimants. Debtholders and stockholders contribute a resource, namely
financial capital. In exchange they receive a claim on the firm's expected
revenue stream. Following convention, we will refer to the claim of
debtholders and stockholders as a claim on cashflow-that portion of the
firm's revenue stream remaining after the firm pays other claimants.
("We are witnessing the 'leveraging of America.' There are alarming prospects for massive accumu-
lations of unnecessary corporate debt.... I am concerned.., about the long-range implications of
forced leveraging of the American corporation, particularly if there is an economic downturn.").
22. Seminal articles that developed this perspective are Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Infor.
mation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
23. Armen Alchian made this point to us in a conversation.
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Because the controversy over leveraged takeovers concerns the
"proper" mix of corporate debt and equity in firms' capital structures, a
close examination of the economic distinction between these two classes
of claimants is appropriate. First, both debtholders and stockholders ef-
fectively lend money to the firm in exchange for some expected payment
stream. In exchange for their funds, debtholders (except, of course, hold-
ers of zero-coupon bonds) receive apromised stream of coupon payments
in addition to the payment of principal upon maturity of the loan. Thus,
debtholders have a fixed claim on the firm's cash flow, and their claim
has a higher priority than the stockholder's claim. Debtholders may
"purchase" further protection of their claim in the form of sinking-fund
provisions or bond covenants restricting the firm's right to alter dividend
policy, sell assets, or issue more debt.
In exchange for their funds, stockholders receive a property right to
the firm's residual value-the difference between the liquidation value of
the firm's assets and the discounted value of its other outstanding claims.
The firm usually pays out part of this value periodically to stockholders
in the form of dividend payments. These payments are analogous to cou-
pon payments received by debtholders. Unlike debtholders, however,
stockholders are not promised a predetermined stream of dividend pay-
ments and do not receive the principal value of their loan at a maturity
date. Rather, stockholders receive a return according to the firm's
residual value. Unanticipated changes in a firm's cash flow, therefore,
have a greater effect on the wealth of stockholders than on the wealth of
debtholders.
This discussion demonstrates that debtholders and stockholders are
not distinguished, in any economic sense, by whether or not they lend
funds to the firm. Only the nature of the firm's obligation to repay their
respective "loans" distinguishes their claims. Debtholders have greater
certainty vis-a-vis stockholders that the firm will repay their loan in full
because they have a fixed claim and a higher priority. The failure to
recognize that both debt and equity effectively constitute corporate bor-
rowing frequently leads to erroneous comparisons between corporate
debt and either government debt or personal debt.24
24. An exchange between Professor Michael Bradley and Senator William Proxmire during a
hearing on leveraged takeovers illustrates this point:
Senator Proxmire: ... [Ojur National Government is deeper in debt than ever. We have a
trade deficit that's enormous. We are very dependent on foreign borrowing. And now our
corporations seem to be getting more and more highly leveraged, which is another way of
saying more and more deeply in debt.
1987]
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Although we will examine ways in which debt-equity ratios might af-
fect cash flows, it is important at this juncture to recognize that a logical
distinction exists between the level of a firm's cash flows and the division
of claims against those cash flows. To illustrate this, consider the exam-
ple contained in Table 2.
The value of a firm, typically defined as the discounted value of the
firm's cash flow, equals the value of the claims against the cash flow,
namely the value of the debt claims plus the value of the equity claims.
In this example, two firms initially have an identical value of $1000.
Firm A is highly leveraged-the value of its debt obligations is $900 and
the value of its equity is $100. Firm B has a "clean" balance sheet-it
has no debt obligations and the value of its equity is $1000.
TABLE 2: EFFEcT OF CHANGE IN DISCOUNTED VALUE OF CASH
FLOWS ON VALUE OF DEBT AND EQUITY
Discounted Value of Cash Flows $1000 $800
(i.e., Value of Firm)
Firm A-Highly Leveraged
Value of Debt 900 800
Value of Equity 100 0
Firm B-No Leverage
Value of Debt 0 0
Value of Equity 1000 800
Now suppose that both firms suffer an unanticipated $200 decline in
expected cash flows, arising from an unanticipated decline in demand or
an unanticipated increase in input prices. If the costs of reorganizing
financial claims was zero, then both firms would be revalued at $800.
Mr. Bradley: Well, I think we have to make a distinction between borrowing or debt at the
corporate level versus the Government or a personal level. When you think of debt or
equity in a corporate capital structure, the only distinction between the two is which group
has the safer part of the earnings produced by the firm. In other words, bondholders just
stand in line before equity holders. And what we're doing is in a sense piecing out the risks
of the corporation between bondholders and equity holders.
It's not like my personal wealth where I have my personal equity and then I borrow
somebody else's money. A corporation exists for the production of goods and services and
it gets funds from both bondholders and stockholders. Stockholders and bondholders both
lend money to the corporation. What they lend money for is simply a promise for a future
payment. Bondholders have a promise of safer dollars, but nevertheless, the corporation, if
we can use that legal entity, is borrowing both from equity holders and bondholders. So,
from that perspective, I don't think it has the same concern for the corporation it would for
you or me.
HEARINGS ON THE EFFEcT OF MERGERS, supra note 11, at 135-36.
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Because debtholders have a prior claim to $900 of Firm A's cash flows,
equity holders in Firm A sustain a wealth loss of $ 100-the value of their
claim declines from $100 to $0. Since the value of Firm A has fallen
below the value of its debt obligations, Firm A is "in bankruptcy." Its
debtholders now own a claim, in effect an equity claim, on the full value
of the firm, but they sustain a $100 wealth loss as the value of their claim
declines from $900 to $800. Thus, debtholders and stockholders share
equally the decline in Firm A's value.
Contrast the outcome in Firm A with the outcome in Firm B. Since
Firm B has no outstanding debt, the stockholders sustain the entire $200
decline in firm value. The value of their claim declines from $1000 to
$800. Although Firm B avoids bankruptcy, its stockholders sustain a
wealth loss equal to the combined wealth loss sustained by debtholders
and stockholders in Firm A.
This example illustrates that the loss of value often associated with
bankruptcy derives not necessarily from the fact that a firm is bankrupt,
but from the loss in the value of the cash flow generated by a firm's
assets.25 Regardless of a firm's capital structure, a reduction in the firm's
cash flows creates wealth losses for anyone having a claim to the cash
flows.
Once one recognizes that loss of value is related only to the level of a
firm's cash flow and not the claims against that cash flow, the focus must
shift to the effects of a leveraged takeover on a firm's cash flow. Either
explicitly or implicitly, critics of leveraged takeovers must assume that,
beyond some debt-equity level, additional leverage reduces a firm's ex-
pected cash flow. Accordingly, we turn now to a discussion of the rela-
tionship between a firm's capital structure and its value.
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller developed an analytical
framework for examining how the mix of debt and equity claims can
25. A popular finance textbook develops this point by critiquing a common perception about
bankruptcy:
Bankruptcies are [often] thought of as corporate funerals. The mourners (creditors and
especially stockholders) look at their firm's present sad state. They think of how valuable
their securities used to be and how little is left. Moreover, they think of the lost value as a
cost of bankruptcy. That is the mistake. The decline in the value of assets is what the
mourning is really about. That has no necessary connection with financing. The bank-
ruptcy is merely a legal mechanism for allowing creditors to take over when the decline in
value of assets triggers a default.
Bankruptcy is not the cause of the decline in value. It is the result.
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 385 (1985).
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affect firm value."5 First, the tax system favors debt financing over equity
financing. The firm may deduct interest expenses, but not dividends and
retained earnings. Because the federal government effectively pays a per-
centage of a firm's interest expense (the percentage being equal to the
firm's nominal corporate tax rate), the firm's cash flow increases by that
amount. All else being equal, this tax bias creates a direct relationship
between a firm's debt-equity ratio and its value. Absent some counter-
vailing effect on cash flow, the tax bias would favor firms financed exclu-
sively with debt.
Modigliani and Miller suggest, however, that the costs associated with
bankruptcy-i.e., the costs associated with reorganizing financial claims
when firm value falls below the value of its debt obligations-counteract
the tax bias. In the example above, we assumed a costless bankruptcy
process. Relaxing that assumption, it becomes evident that a relationship
exists between debt-equity ratios and expected bankruptcy costs. The
likelihood of bankruptcy (i.e., the likelihood that a firm's value falls be-
low the value of its debt obligations) varies directly with debt-equity ra-
tios. Because expected bankruptcy costs reduce expected cash flows,
then, beyond some debt-equity ratio, an inverse relationship exists be-
tween a firm's debt-equity ratio and its value.
Bankruptcy entails two types of costs: the costs of bankruptcy per se
and the indirect costs associated with the effect that impending bank-
ruptcy may have on the incentives of stockholders to redistribute wealth
from debtholders in ways that reduce firm value. Theper se costs include
the administrative costs of bankruptcy (e.g., legal fees) and the indirect
costs of impaired governance of bankrupt firms. In a sample of eleven
railroad bankruptcies, Warner found that the direct costs of bankruptcy
proceedings amounted to approximately 5.3% of pre-bankruptcy firm
value.2 7 Assuming that Warner's data is representative of direct bank-
ruptcy costs generally, expected direct bankruptcy costs-the probability
of bankruptcy times the direct costs-are likely to be small.
Bankruptcyper se also imposes indirect costs. In bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the adjudication process may retard efficient operation of the firm.
The disparate claims of creditors often generate conflicts between credi-
tors concerning both the level and the riskiness of a firm's investments.
These conflicts, along with the creditors' power to vote on reorganization
26. Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Invest-
ment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
27. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977).
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plans, raise the cost of corporate decision-making and may result in fore-
gone opportunities for profitable investments. These foregone investment
opportunities represent a real cost of bankruptcy, albeit a one that is diffi-
cult to quantify.
In addition to the costs of bankruptcy, there are also costs associated
with conflicting interests between stockholders and bondholders. For ex-
ample, stockholders are likely to prefer that a firm invest in riskier
projects, sometimes even if they are negative return projects, because
such projects increase the value of the firm's equity at the expense of
bondholders.2 8 Recognizing this danger, debtholders may wish to nego-
tiate covenants which restrict the behavior of management to redistribute
wealth in this manner.29 In addition, debtholders may wish to restrict
the firm's ability to alter dividend policy, sell assets, and adopt other
policies which potentially raise shareholder wealth while reducing
debtholders' wealth. However, since it is costly to negotiate and enforce
these covenants, this potential appropriation of wealth by stockholders
becomes another cost of leverage.
Another potential conflict between bondholders and shareholders
arises when the firm's ability (or willingness) to repay the principal
amount of the debt depends in part on the profitability of future invest-
ment opportunities.30 If the debt matures after shareholders discover the
value of the investment opportunities, the shareholders will only invest in
projects whose values exceed the sum of the cost of project and the face
value of the maturing debt. Thus, shareholders will forego some profita-
ble projects and default on the debt if the cash flows from such projects
are insufficient to retire the debt.3" Possible resolutions of this conflict
are shortening the effective maturity of the debt by including call or sink-
ing fund provisions in the indenture, or allowing renegotiation of the
debt contracts once the value of investment opportunities is revealed.
However, it is costly to include such provisions in the bond contract.
Using the Modigliani-Miller framework, scholars have examined other
factors (e.g., personal taxes) that might affect the relationship between
capital structure and firm value.32 Although little is known empirically
28. For an illustration of this phenomenon see infra Appendix A. See also Galai and Masulis,
The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 53 (1976).
29. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117 (1970).
30. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
31. For an illustration of this phenomenon, see infra Appendix B.
32. See, eg., Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977).
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about the relationship between capital structure and firm value, system-
atic differences in average debt-equity ratios across industries suggest
cross-sectional variation in optimal debt-equity ratios.3 3 These differ-
ences presumably arise from differing tax advantages and expected bank-
ruptcy costs associated with leverage across industries.
For present purposes, two conclusions should be drawn from the fore-
going discussion of the economics of corporate leverage. First, although
there are costs associated with leverage, namely expected bankruptcy
costs, these costs vary across firms and industries. Secondly, these costs
are unlike the costs frequently portrayed in the public controversy over
leveraged takeover. Critics of leveraged takeovers often confuse changes
in cash flow that induce bankruptcy with the costs of leverage itself.
III. ANALYSIS OF LEVERAGED TAKEOVERS
A. "'Paper" Profits or Real Efficiency Gains?
During Unocal's takeover battle with Mesa, Claude Brinegar, senior
vice-president at Unocal, offered this criticism of Mesa's takeover bid in
testimony before a congressional subcommittee:
There should be a real economic returns to the Nation when you make a
transaction. It should not be a return simply on converting equity to debt.
Unocal does not go out buying Mesas. Unocal tries to use its cash flow and
investment ability to find resources that are good for the Nation. We have
no record of taking over companies in a hostile fashion. If we looked to
acquisition, it would be because we could bring something to it in terms of
asset management and in terms of utilizing resources for productive good.
I think mergers and acquisitions should be focused on the question of
whether or not there is good economic reasons for them, not whether there
is money available for them.34
In a different congressional hearing, Nicholas F. Brady, the chairman
and chief executive officer at Dillon, Read & Company, Unocal's invest-
ment banker during the takeover battle, added that "it offends [him] to
think of corporations that have been in existence for 60 or 70 years being
dismembered for the sake of a few bucks in the stock market. '35
These statements echo the oft-repeated argument that highly leveraged
33. Bradley, Kim, & Jarrell, On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and
Evidence, 39 ". FIN. 857 (1984).
34. Hearings on the Effect of Mergers, supra note 11, at 20 (statement of Claude Brlnegar).
35. Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeover Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 (1985).
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takeovers are "financial transactions for the profit of takeover en-
trepeneurs" which "do not add to national wealth," but "merely rear-
range ownership interests by substituting lenders for shareholders and
shift risk from equity owners to creditors." 6 These arguments fail to
recognize, however, that regardless of how a bidding firm finances a take-
over, it must increase the discounted cash flow of the target firm in order
to earn positive returns on its acquisitions. To illustrate this point, we
consider the Mesa-Unocal case.
In order to pay a substantial cash premium in its initial tender offer for
Unocal's common stock, Mesa borrowed $3.8 billion. Furthermore, it
expected to issue an additional $4.7 billion in subordinated debt and pre-
ferred stock in order to acquire the remaining 49.9% of Unocal's stock.
All told, Mesa was prepared to issue an $8.5 billion claim on the post-
merger cash flow of the combined companies. Based on the $5.5 billion
market value of Unocal's common stock at the end of 1984,17 Mesa's
takeover bid would have increased the value of claims on Unocal's cash
flow by approximately three billion dollars, or 54.4% over the value of
these claims at the end of 1984.
Upon successfully completing the takeover bid, Mesa would have be-
come Unocal's sole stockholder. Mesa's claim, then, would have become
a junior claim vis-a-vis the newly issued debt. In order to earn a positive
return on this acquisition, Mesa would have had to increase Unocal's
discounted cash flows by more than three billion dollars, the premium
that it offered to pay for Unocal's stock. If Mesa was unable to raise
Unocal's cash flows by this amount, it would have had to divert cash flow
from its pre-merger operations, thereby reducing the value of its equity
and suffering a loss from this acquisition. Clearly, then, Mesa expected
to increase Unocal's discounted cash flow upon successful completion of
the merger. The market concurred with Mesa's expectation. As previ-
ously reported, the market positively revalued Mesa's common stock
during its offer for Unocal.
How did Mesa expect to increase Unocal's cash flow? In a supplement
to its Schedule 14D filing with the SEC, 8 Mesa addressed this question
36. Hearings on the Effect of Mergers, supra note 11, at 7 (statement of Martin Lipton).
37. The market value of Unocal's common stock at the end of 1984 was approximately $6.4
billion. See supra note 17. Prior to its tender offer for Unocal, Mesa held a 13.6% stake in Unocal
common stock. Thus, the market value of Unocal's outstanding shares exclusive of those holdings
totaled $5.5 billion (0.864 X $6.4 billion).
38. Mesa's Schedule 14D filing with the SEC stated:
The Purchasers believe that funds to pay interest and dividends on, as well as to repay and
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stating that it intended to service the newly created debt by reducing
Unocal's capital expenditures and possibly selling some of Unocal's as-
sets. In short, Mesa intended to adopt the very strategies that critics
assert threaten the long-term competitiveness of U.S. corporations. As
one critic stated, "[w]e are mortgaging the future of American industry
to satisfy the greedy raiders .... [I]f heavy debt loads are imposed by an
artificial corporate environment created by raiders who care little for
what went before, or what remains after, American industry's competi-
tive strength will be further undermined."39
The argument that a bidder in a highly leveraged takeover desires
short-term gratification and disdains long-term investments ignores real-
ity. As a controlling stockholder in the surviving firm, a successful bid-
der owns only a residual claim on the target firm's discounted cash flow.
Foregoing profitable (i.e., positive return) long-term investments to ser-
vice takeover-related debt diminishes the target firm's cash flow and im-
poses losses on the bidder.
If, on the other hand, a target firm has invested in unprofitable (i.e.,
negative return) projects prior to the takeover, then abandonment of
those projects raises the discounted value of the firm's cash flow and pro-
vides the bidder with the opportunity to realize a positive return from its
acquisition. For example, suppose that XYZ Corporation invests in sev-
eral negative-return projects and that the market accordingly prices its
equity at $10 per share. Assume further that if XYZ abandons these
projects and distributes the expenditures intended for these projects to
shareholders, its stock price would be $15 per share. A bidder who de-
redeem, all of the securities and other obligations referred to above can be provided by
operations and working capital of the Company. ... The Purchasers have no present
intent to sell any asset sales would be necessary to make the required payments with re-
spect to the total amount of securities and other obligations that would be issued if all
outstanding shares were acquired as described above. If the future financial performance
of the Company after the Merger is not sufficient to make required payments on the securi-
ties and other obligations, the Company might sell assets.... In general, estimated future
capital expenditures, including expenditures for foreign and domestic exploration for oil
and natural gas, were reduced significantly in the forecasts from historical levels.... The
Purchasers expect that capital expenditures after the Offer and Merger would be reduced
from historical levels, in part to maximize cash flow available to service the securities and
other obligations to be issued to provide funds to finance the Offer and in the Merger,
However,... the Purchasers ... would expect to continue to make capital investments in
projects which met appropriate rate of return criteria.
39. Media Mergers and Takeovers: The FCC and the Public Interest: Hearings Before the Sub.
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, 79 (1985) (statement of Thornton Bradshaw, former chairman
of RCA Corp.).
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tects XYZ's unprofitable investment policy could earn a positive return
by acquiring XYZ for a price of less than $15 per share and then termi-
nating its negative-return projects. If the bidder finances the takeover
exclusively with debt, it could service the debt with the funds that other-
wise would finance the negative-return projects.
Mesa's bid for Unocal displays the principles evident in this example
and in a theory of takeover motivation recently developed by Jensen.'
Economists and legal scholars have long recognized a potential conflict
between managerial incentives and shareholder interests in publicly
traded companies, which are characterized by diffuse ownership struc-
tures and relatively small shareholdings by corporate managers.41 This
potential conflict arises because managers in these firms do not bear the
full wealth consequences of their decisions. Their decisions affect the
value of all outstanding equity, yet they own relatively little equity. If
the "outside" (i.e., non-management) equity is held diffusely, "incom-
plete" monitoring of managers will result because no individual share-
holder can recoup the full value costly monitoring yields.
Jensen argues that this conflict is especially severe in firms that gener-
ate significant free cash flow, i.e., "cash flow in excess of that required to
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at
the relevant cost of capital."' 42 Firms with low growth prospects but
strong earning ability generally have substantial free cash flow. Low
growth prospects, however, limit opportunities to reinvest that cash flow
profitably in a firm's current lines of business. If the firm's management
specializes in its current lines of business, then it is unprofitable to invest
the cash flow in acquisition of new lines of business. Value-maximization
dictates distribution of the cash flow to the shareholders.
Jensen maintains that managers often prefer to retain free cash flow to
expand their firm's size, even if this expansion diminishes shareholders'
wealth. From an efficiency perspective, the problem thus becomes "how
to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at be-
low the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies."
43
Hostile takeovers represent one method by which shareholders can miti-
gate this conflict. As Professor Manne has argued, a manager who does
40. Jensen, Agency and Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM.
EcON. REV. 323 (1986).
41. See, eg., A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1933).
42. Jensen, supra note 40, at 323.
43. Id.
19871
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
not profitably deploy free cash flow will find his firm's stock price de-
pressed, thereby raising the likelihood of a hostile takeover."
Since the early 1980's, the oil industry has been characterized by sub-
stantial free cash flow.45 By the late 1970's, the leveling (and subsequent
decline) of oil prices, high interest rates, and increased costs of drilling
and exploration caused growth prospects in the industry to decline. Yet,
oil companies still had considerable earning ability due to a significant
divergence between the price of crude oil and the average cost of ex-
tracting proven oil reserves. Rather than distribute the free cash flow to
shareholders via stock repurchases or dividend increases, many oil com-
panies continued to reinvest free cash flow into negative-return explora-
tion projects. Evidence shows that, on average, the market negatively
revalued the equity of oil companies upon the announcement of new ex-
ploration programs during the late 1970's.46
This evidence provides a rationale for Mesa's offer for Unocal. By
diverting free cash flow from investment in negative-return projects to
service the debt used to finance the substantial premiums offered to Uno-
cal's shareholders, Mesa's takeover would have disgorged Unocal's free
cash flow. In effect, the offered premium represented a lower bound on
the value Mesa expected to create by terminating Unocal's unprofitable
investments and distributing the free cash flow directly to Unocal's se-
curity holders.
Abstracting from the Mesa-Unocal case, a leveraged takeover does not
create "paper" profits for a bidder financed by diminution in the value of
the target firm's assets. In order to earn a positive return on its acquisi-
tion, a bidder must raise the discounted cash flow of the target firm by
more than the corresponding premium, regardless of how it finances the
acquisition. Because the newly issued debt has a claim on cash flow that
is senior to the bidder's equity position, failure to raise cash flow to ser-
vice takeover-related debt diminishes the value of the bidder's claim.
The post-takeover restructuring of the target firm, which typically ac-
companies a successful leveraged takeover, does not destroy economic
wealth. Rather, a takeover redeploys the target firm's assets to higher
valued uses, thereby creating economic wealth.47
44. See Manne, Managers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
45. See Jensen, supra note 40, at 326-27.
46. McConnell & Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and the Market Value of
the Firm, (forthcoming J. FIN. ECON.).
47. A bidding firm could raise the discounted value of a firm's cash flow without improving
social efficiency in two situations: 1) if reduced tax liability of the combined firms financed the
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B. Two-Tier Leveraged Takeovers
Many critics of leveraged takeovers consider leveraged two-tier take-
overs especially abusive. Critics assert that in a highly leveraged two-tier
offer, the subordinated status of the securities issued in the second tier
creates a great disparity between the value of the first-tier offer and the
value of the second-tier offer. This disparity not only treats target share-
holders inequitably, critics argue, but it also creates a "prisoner's di-
lemma"48 among target shareholders, which may facilitate acquisition of
the target firm.
To illustrate the "prisoner's dilemma," consider the following exam-
ple. Assume that Firm A has 100 shares of outstanding common stock
trading at a price of $40 per share. Hence, the market value of Firm A is
$4000. Now suppose that a bidder makes the following two-tier bid for
Firm A: $50 per share for the first fifty-one shares (with proration the
Williams Act requires49) and $20 per share for the remaining forty-nine
shares. The value of this offer is $3530 [($50 X 51) + ($20 X 49)].
Because the firm's market value exceeds the value of this offer, it is in the
collective interest of shareholders to reject this offer. If shareholders can-
not coordinate their behavior at an efficient cost, this offer might never-
theless succeed. Each individual shareholder, preferring the $50 per
share first-tier offer to his present $40 share, has an incentive to tender
into the first-tier, hoping that his shares are not prorated (i.e., that share-
holders tender fifty-one shares or fewer). If all shareholders tender, how-
ever, the prorated value of the offer is $35.30 per share ($3530 * 100).
Each shareholder is worse off than before the offer. In short, the dispar-
ity between the value of the offer in the two tiers allows the bidder to
acquire the target for a price below its "true" market value.
This argument ignores the role played by competing bids. If one bid-
der attempted to acquire a $4000 firm for $3530 by constructing the offer
described above, other bidders would find it in their interest to submit
higher offers until the blended value of the winning offer at least equalled
tender offer premium; or 2) if the takeover would facilitate anti-competitive pricing of the combined
firms' products. Neither of these cases, however, provides an argument against leveraged takeovers
per se. To the extent that tax motivations for tender offers are considered socially wasteful, the
"problem" lies in the tax inducements to merge, a tax issue. To the extent that a desire for monop-
oly profits motivates a leveraged takeover, this is an antitrust concern, not a concern about leveraged
takeovers generally.
48. For a discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma" problem, see P. ARANSON, AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 56 (1981).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
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the pre-offer market value of the target firm. A competitive market for
corporate control, therefore, precludes bidders from using these offers
simply to obtain target firms at "below-market" values.
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. An SEC study which
found that on average, shareholders in the second-tier of two-tier take-
overs receive premiums of 44.8% over the pre-offer price of target
firms.5" Although this average premium falls short of the average first-
tier premium of 62.8%, it nonetheless represents a significant increase in
shareholders' wealth. The study also reported that the average blended
premium associated with two-tier takeovers was 54.5%. The data in the
Mesa-Unocal transaction reveal that Mesa's second-tier offer represented
a premium over Unocal's pre-offer price. On the day Mesa announced its
tender offer, evidence suggests that the market valued Mesa's second-tier
offer at $45.48 per share-a premium of 31.3% over Unocal's pre-offer
stock price.5
50. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURmES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PARTIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS, (1985); See also OFFIc E OF
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECurrEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE ECONOMICS OF PARTIAL
AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS, reprinted in [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (June 21,
1984).
51. Recall that Mesa's offer consisted of $54 in cash per share for 36.5% of the shares, which
would give Mesa a 50.1% stake, and $54 in subordinated securities for the remaining 49.9% of the
shares. On the day Mesa announced its offer, Unocal's stock price closed at $49.75 per share, where,
presumably:
$49.75 = (p X V) + (P2 X V2)
where
Pi probability that Mesa's offer is successful;
V = value of Mesa's offer;
P2 - probability that Mesa's offer is unsuccessful;
V2 - value of Unocal's stock if Mesa's offer is unsuccessful;
Unocal's closing stock price on the day of Mesa's tender offer equalled a weighted sum of the value
of Mesas offer plus the value of Unocal's stock if the offer failed, with the weights being the
probability of the two respective events. Assume that V2 < V1, that is, the value of Unocal would be
lower if Mesa's offer failed than if it succeeded. The minimum value of Mesa's second-tier offer can
then be calculated by assuming thatp
, 
= 1, i.e., that there was complete certainty that Mesa's offer
would be successful. This assumption is made only for convenience; the lowerpt is, the greater V, is,
holding Unocal's stock price constant at $49.75 per share. Hence, this assumption biases against
finding a high value of the second-tier compensation. Ifpl = I then:
$49.75 = V = (0.501 X $54) + (0.499 X X)
where X is the value of the second-tier compensation. In other words, the value of Mesa's offer
equalled $54 times 0.50 1, the percentage of shares it was seeking, plus X times 0.499, the remaining
percentage of shares. Rearranging terms,
x - 49 6/8 - (0.501 x $54) _ $49.75 - 27.0540.499 - 0.499 - $45.48
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C. Bondholders' Wealth in Leveraged Takeovers
Critics of leveraged takeovers also argue that bondholders and pre-
ferred stockholders of the target firm, and possibly the bidding firm, suf-
fer significant wealth losses in these transactions. Because the value of
the firm consists of the sum of the value of all claims against the firm's
cash flows (i.e., the value of the bonds, preferred stock, and common
stock), leveraged takeovers may actually diminish the value of target
firms, if the losses to bondholders and preferred stockholders exceed the
gains to common stockholders in these transactions. Morey McDaniel
argues that corporate directors should have a fiduciary duty to protect
bondholders from wealth expropriation associated with leverage-increas-
ing transactions, including leveraged takeovers.52
Although empirical evidence on the effect of leveraged takeovers on
the wealth of bondholders and preferred stockholders is inconclusive,5"
the "bondholder redistribution" argument, in our view, does not justify
regulation of leveraged takeovers. Bondholders (and presumably, pre-
ferred stockholders) can protect themselves with negative pledge clauses,
restricted sale-leaseback agreements, and other convenants restricting is-
suance of secured debt. Bondholders are likely to pay a price for this
protection in the form of lower coupon rates than they would otherwise
receive. Bondholders who forego this protection presumably receive a
premium in exchange for bearing some increased risk of wealth expropri-
ation. 4 Unless transaction costs impair the efficiency of the market for
bondholder protection, protecting bondholders provides no justification
for a public policy remedy in leveraged takeovers.
Coase's proposition 55 also suggests that, with low transaction costs,
52. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 414 (1986).
53. Masulis, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange
Offers, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1980), reports empirical evidence that supports the argument that lever-
age-increasing transactions diminish bondholders' wealth. Masulis found that when firms announce
an offer to exchange debt for their outstanding common stock, the value of the firm's outstanding
non-convertible bonds declines. Two studies were unable to find systematic diminution in bond
values upon the announcement of tender offers and leveraged buyouts. See D. Dennis & J. McCon-
nell, Corporate Mergers and Security Returns, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 143 (1986); Lehn & Poulsen, Lever-
aged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed? in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS (M. Weidenbaum ed. forthcoming 1987).
54. William Gross, managing director of Pacific Investment Management Co., commenting on
the demand for takeover-related bond covenants, stated that "[i]ndustrial corporations are finally
becoming aware that their bonds aren't attractive without protections for bondholders against take-
over." See "Poison Put" Bonds are Latest Weapon on Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, Wall St.
J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 5, cols. 1, 3.
55. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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fiduciary protection of bondholders in leveraged takeovers would affect
only the distribution of wealth associated with these takeovers; it would
have virtually no effect on the dollar volume of leveraged takeovers.5 6
Coase theorized that when transaction costs are low, the allocation of
resources will be efficient and invariant with respect to the initial assign-
ment of property rights." In this context, suppose initially that the legal
system protects bondholders' wealth in leveraged takeovers. If a pro-
posed leveraged takeover would create $100 in shareholder gains and $5
in bondholder losses, then, assuming low transaction costs, shareholders
would accept the offer, pay bondholders $5, and receive $95 in net gains.
If the legal system provided no protection, then, of course, shareholders
would accept the offer and keep the full $100 in gains. In this example,
the leveraged takeover succeeds regardless of the rights afforded to
bondholders.
Now suppose that bondholders have a legal right to protection in
leveraged takeovers and that a proposed leveraged takeover would create
$50 in shareholder gains and $75 in bondholder losses. This transaction
would not succeed because shareholders would refuse to compensate
bondholders by more than $50 and bondholders would consent for no
less than $75. Even assuming low transaction costs and no legal protec-
tion for bondholders the offer would fail. In this case, bondholders
would find it in their interest to compensate shareholders by an amount
between $50-$75 in exchange for shareholder rejection of the leveraged
takeover. By paying less than $75 to avert a $75 loss, bondholders would
recognize an increase in wealth. By accepting an offer exceeding the
takeover price, shareholders would be made better off as well. The offer
would fail despite the bondholders' right to protection. Thus, assuming
low transaction costs, only leveraged takeovers that raise firm value (i.e.,
the summed value of the debt claims and the equity claims) will succeed.
As a practical matter, in most leveraged takeovers bondholders' losses
are likely to be small vis-a-vis stockholders' gains. If critics of leveraged
takeovers were correct, one would expect bondholders to have sustained
especially high losses as a result of Mesa's bid for Unocal because Mesa
financed the bid exclusively with debt. The evidence suggests, however,
that although Unocal's bondholders did suffer wealth losses associated
with Mesa's offer, these losses were small compared to stockholders'
56. A similar discussion appears in N. Beare, Leveraged Buyouts: Are Shareholders' Gains
Merely Bondholder Losses?, (November 3, 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
57. This assumes that there are no wealth-induced effects on Consumer demand.
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gains. To offset the shareholder gains associated with the takeover, the
combined value of Unocal's debt and Mesa's debt would have had to
decline by approximately 63.8%.58 The value of two Unocal non-con-
vertible bonds, with a combined face value of $303 million and maturing
in 1998 and 2002, declined by only 4.2% and 3% respectively.59 If these
losses are representative of losses to other Unocal and Mesa debtholders,
debtholders in the two firms would have lost approximately $170 million.
Stockholders' gains, by comparison, would have amounted to $3 billion.
Hence, even if stockholders had restored the debtholders' losses in this
transaction, the stockholders' net gain would have exceeded $2.8 billion.
In summary, empirical evidence supports the conclusion that in some
leveraged takeovers bondholders' losses partially offset stockholders'
gains. Whether or not this phenomenon is a central tendency in lever-
aged takeovers awaits additional empirical investigation. Conceptually,
however, the issue of bondholder protection implicates the distributional
effects of leveraged takeovers rather than a priori "efficiency" concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent controversy over corporate takeovers has spawned several
criticisms of leveraged takeovers. In our view, however, none of these
criticisms advances a convincing economic rationale for further regula-
tion of leveraged takeovers. Regardless of how a bidder finances a take-
over, these transactions generally promote more efficient resource
allocation. Moreover, the possibility of competing bids precludes lever-
aged two-tier tender offers, and contrary to common perception, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that critics exaggerate the disparity between first-
tier premiums and second-tier premiums in these offers. Finally, Coase's
analysis of property rights suggests that assigning bondholders a legal
right to protection in leveraged takeovers would affect the distribution,
but not the magnitude, of wealth gains in these transactions.
58. The combined value of Unocal's stock and Mesa's stock increased by approximately $3
billion during Mesa's attempted takeover. The combined book value of Unocal's and Mesa's debt
before the offer was approximately $4.7 billion.
59. The data on these bond prices came from monthly editions of MOODY'S BOND RECORD,
(Jan. 1985-June 1985).
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APPENDIX A
Suppose that Firm A and Firm B each have a value of $1000. As in
the example above, Firm A has $900 of outstanding debt and $100 of
outstanding equity, and Firm B has outstanding debt of $0 and outstand-
ing equity of $1000. Both firms must choose between two investment
opportunities that require identical outlays of $300. Option 1 will gener-
ate $200 of discounted cash flow with probability of 0.5 and $450 of dis-
counted cash flow with probability of 0.5. Hence, the expected
discounted cash flow generated by Option 1 is $325 [(0.5 X $200) + (0.5
X $450)]. Option 2 will generate $0 of discounted cash flow with
probability of 0.9 and $2000 of discounted cash flow with probability of
0.1. Hence, the expected discounted cash flow generated by Option 2 is
$200 [(0.9 X $0) + (0.1 X $2000)]. Because both projects require a
$300 outlay, Option 1 generates $25 in expected returns, while Option 2
generates negative expected returns of $100. Option 2 is also a riskier
investment project than Option 1-the standard deviation of returns for
Option 2 is $600 while the standard deviation in returns for Option 1 is
only $125.
The data in Table Al demonstrate the conflict that exists between
stockholders and bondholders concerning the riskiness of investment
projects in highly leveraged firms. Although Option 1 raises firm value
to $1025 and Option 2 reduces firm value to $900, shareholders in Firm
A prefer Option 2, while bondholders in Firm A prefer the value-maxi-
mizing option, Option 1. The disparity in their preferences derives from
an asymmetry in the sharing of gains and losses. Because Firm A is
highly leveraged, shareholders bear relatively little downside risk, namely
the value of their pre-investment equity claim. Hence, if the investment
project fails, bondholders bear a disproportionate share of the losses.
Stockholders, however, capture all of the gains if the investment project
succeeds, because they own the residual claim. The expected payoff to
stockholders of Option 1 is $125 and the expected payoff of Option 2 is
$180. If stockholders are risk neutral, that is, if their sole objective is to
maximize expected payoffs, then stockholders in Firm A prefer the risk-
ier option, Option 2, even though it reduces the firm's value. Contrast
this outcome with the outcome in Firm B, the firm with no outstanding
debt. Because stockholders in Firm B bear all of the wealth gains or
losses associated with investment projects, they prefer the project with
the highest expected payoff, Option 1.
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TABLE Al
Firm A
Value of Debt
Value of Equity
Total Firm Value
Firm B
Value of Debt
Value of Equity
Total Firm Value
Firm A
Value of Debt
Value of Equity
Total Firm Value
Firm B
Value of Debt
Value of Equity
Total Firm Value
Pre-Investment
$ 900
100
1000
0
1000
$1000
Pre-Investment
$ 900
100
1000
0
1000
$1000
$200
(p= 0 .5 )
$900
0
90
0
900
$900
$0
(p= 0.9)
$700
0
700
0
700
$700
Option l's Payoffs
$450
(p=0.5)
$ 900
250
1150
0
1050
$1050
Option 2's Payoffs
$2000
(p=0.1)
$ 900
1800
2700
0
2700
$2700
In short, this example illustrates that stockholders in highly leveraged
firms are likely to prefer riskier projects than bondholders, even if invest-
ment in those projects reduces firm value. Because firms approaching
bankruptcy are firms in which the value of debt obligations is large rela-
tive to the value of the equity claims, this phenomenon may be quite
pronounced for firms in financial distress.
Expected
Values
$ 900
125
1025
0
1025
$1025
Expected
Values
$720
180
900
0
900
$900
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APPENDIX B
Suppose that KDW Corporation has just incorporated to develop a
revolutionary genetic engineering process which produces a drug that
cures cancer.* The actual dollar returns from the new venture are uncer-
tain pending approval of the drug by the Food and Drug Administration.
If the firm decides to undertake the venture after getting the FDA evalu-
ation, the project will require a $4000 outlay. Keep in mind that the firm
has the option to undertake the venture, depending on the FDA
evaluation.
The shareholders would like to borrow against the prospective project,
and have written a debt contract promising to pay $3000 to the lender.
The repayment of the $3000 is due after the decision regarding whether
to proceed with the genetic engineering venture. The firm will use the
$3000 to pay an immediate dividend to shareholders.
TABLE B1
ILLUSTRATION OF THE INCENTIVE OF SHAREHOLDERS TO
FOREGO PROFITABLE PROJECTS WHEN GROWTH
OPTIONS ARE FINANCED WITH DEBT
Will Firm Make Investment?
All $3000
FDA Finding (State) Cash Flow Profit** Equity Debt
1. Process approved $10,000 $6,000 yes yes
2. Process approved with 6,000 2,000 yes no
modification
3. Process rejected 2,000 (2,000) no no
Table B 1 shows the one-time cash flows that the firm receives from the
project under three possible FDA findings. If the process is approved,
(State 1), the firm, and thus the shareholders, receive a cash flow of
$10,000. The project will be profitable because the cash flow less the
initial outlay ($10,000 - $4000 = $6000) is positive. If the FDA gives
approval subject to modification of the process, (State 2), the project will
yield a smaller profit of only $2000. If FDA disapproves the process,
(State3), the firm will suffer a $2000 loss. Given that the shareholders
can choose whether to undertake the project, it appears that they would
* This illustration is based on an example developed by Professor Ronald E. Shrieves of The
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
** Profit equals cash flow minus initial investment.
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accept the project only in state 1 or 2 and reject the project if state 3
occurs. Clearly, the shareholders will profit from the project under state
1 or 2 and will lose if they adopt the project under state 3. However,
these conclusions hold only if the firm does not issue debt; that is, if the
firm is financed only with equity. If the firm borrows the $3000 men-
tioned above, the shareholders' decision rule changes.
Economic theory suggests that firm value is maximized when a firm
adopts all profitable projects. Further, theory suggests that if perfectly
competitive markets for financial capital are presumed, the decision to
invest in a project should be independent of the means of financing the
project. If the firm issues debt supported by growth options (future in-
vestment opportunities), perverse investment incentives may result.
Namely, the firm may reject some projects which are profitable in the
sense that the appropriately discounted cash flows exceed the initial
outlay.
In the example developed above, the shareholders will not undertake
the new project under state 2 when the firm is financed partially by debt.
The shareholders will only accept projects whose cash flows exceed the
sum of the initial outlay and the debt repayment. Rather than accepting
all profitable projects (any project with a cash flow greater than $4000),
shareholders will only accept projects whose cash flows exceed $4000
plus the amount of the debt repayment ($3000) or $7000. Shareholders
would rather forego an ostensibly profitable project and default on the
debt than suffer a $2000 loss to bondholders if state 2 occurs. Thus,
under state 2, KDW Corp. rejects the project, and the value of the firm is
$2000 less than it would have been had the project been adopted. Be-
cause the debt is supported by the growth opportunity, the shareholders
will default if state 2 occurs.
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